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Managing Disputes with 
Nonmarket Stakeholders: 
WAGE A FIGHT, WITHDRAW, 
WAIT, OR WORK IT OUT? 
Anne T. Lawrence 
H ow do managers respond when confronted with the demands of activist stakeholders over whom they exercise no direct control? What strategies do managers adopt, and why? Which of these are most effective, and under what conditions? Increasingly, 
businesses today face difficult challenges at the intersection of evolving manage­
rial practice, changing public expectations, and newly emergent techniques of 
stakeholder influence. The landscape of such contested terrain has changed dra­
matically in recent years. New communications technologies—including blog­
ging, texting, podcasting, and video posting—enable activists concerned about 
business behavior to mobilize supporters around the world in real time. Societal 
expectations for corporate social and environmental responsibility have never 
been higher. Many firms conduct their work on a global stage, where damage 
to reputation in one location can quickly reverberate around the world. 
Consider the following recent examples of such complex firm-stakeholder 
disputes: 
6h	 Bechtel, the construction and engineering firm, faced a bitter dispute 
over its holdings in Cochabamba, the third-largest city in Bolivia. Through 
a consortium, the firm had purchased the city’s water utility from the 
Bolivian government and had begun modernizing the badly dilapi­
dated system. To help finance these improvements, Bechtel raised water 
rates—stunning local households, farmers, and small businesses that were 
suddenly expected to pay up to a quarter of their income for basic water 
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service. A broad coalition opposed to the rate hikes quickly formed, and 
people took to the streets by the thousands, blocking major roads into the 
city. The army moved in and declared a state of siege. A non-governmen­
tal organization in Cochabamba called The Democracy Center, founded 
just two years earlier, began producing an award-winning blog alerting 
people around the world to the events in Cochabamba and urged sup­
porters to e-mail Bechtel’s CEO directly to demand the company’s with­
drawal.1 
6h	 Unocal found itself at odds with human rights activists over its actions in 
a joint venture to construct a natural gas pipeline in Burma. Unocal, a 
global energy company, had entered into a joint venture with the French 
company Total and the military government of Burma to build a natu­
ral gas pipeline across that country’s southern panhandle. Human rights 
organizations charged that the government used brute force to clear the 
pipeline area, relocating villages and terrorizing the civilian population, 
and forcibly conscripted local people to clear land and build roads for the 
project. Although Unocal did not engage in these acts directly, the compa­
ny’s critics felt that as the government’s partner, it shared moral respon­
sibility. At state and local levels, activists lobbied for an end to contracts 
with firms doing business in Burma. Dissident shareholder resolutions 
gathered support from large public pension funds, and a group of human 
rights activists filed a lawsuit against Unocal in U.S. courts on behalf of 
displaced villagers.2 
6h	 The Japanese conglomerate Mitsubishi, in a joint venture with the Mexi­
can government, undertook to construct the largest salt mining operation 
in the world along the shores of a lagoon on the coast of Baja California. 
The Mexican government saw the project as a source of jobs and tax 
revenue in an economically depressed region. However, a coalition of 
more than 50 environmental organizations strenuously opposed the plan, 
charging the project would endanger 
the Pacific gray whales that migrated 
annually to the lagoon to give birth 
and nurse their young. Opponents took 
out full-page ads in major newspapers, 
enlisted the support of politicians and scientists, and called for a boycott 
of Mitsubishi. More than a million people sent e-mails or signed petitions 
to the company to “save the whales.” Although Mitsubishi was convinced 
that the whales would continue to thrive near the proposed salt works, it 
found its plans blocked at every turn.3 
Disputes like these are often unexpected, and deeply distressing to the 
managers involved. They may be particularly challenging to deal with because 
interactions with activists may fall well outside the boundaries of legal mandates 
and standard operating procedures. Yet, such conflicts must be constructively 
addressed for the success, and sometimes even survival, of the firm. 
Anne T. Lawrence is Professor of Organization 
and Management at San José State University. 
<anne.lawrence@sjsu.edu> 
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This article uses an inductive process of building theory from cases to 
develop a typology of managerial strategies in complex disputes with activ­
ist stakeholders. I will argue that management strategies are of four types, the 
“4Ws.” Management may choose to wage a fight, withdraw, wait, or work it out. 
The case analysis reveals that the choice of strategy is likely to vary according 
to three factors: the firm’s dependence on stakeholders for critical resources, the 
firm’s power in the particular situation, and the urgency of the contested issue. 
Managers’ ability to meet their objectives in such disputes is, in large part, a 
function of their ability to assess these three conditions accurately. 
Business Disputes with Nonmarket Stakeholders 
The term “stakeholder” refers to persons and organizations that affect, 
or are affected by, a corporation’s actions—that is, all those that have a stake in 
what a firm does.4 In the stakeholder model of the firm, business organizations 
are seen as enmeshed in a network involving many participants, each of which 
shares to some degree in both the risks and rewards of the firm’s activities.5 My 
concern here is managerial responses to nonmarket or, as they are sometimes 
called, secondary or societal stakeholders. Market stakeholders (also called primary 
or economic stakeholders) are individuals and groups that engage in direct, eco­
nomic exchanges of goods and services, labor, and capital with the firm; they 
include customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and creditors. Nonmarket 
stakeholders, by contrast, are those that, although they do not engage in direct, 
economic exchange with the firm, are nonetheless affected by or can affect its 
actions. These include the public, local communities, social and environmental 
activists, religious bodies, and non-governmental organizations.6 
Firms’ responses to market and nonmarket stakeholders differ in impor­
tant ways. Interactions with market stakeholders are typically tightly constrained 
by institutional and societal rules and norms. For example, securities laws gov­
ern the dealings of publicly held firms with their shareholders, mandating when 
and how financial information must be reported and granting shareholders the 
legal right to vote on many important matters that come before the firm. With 
respect to employees, firms are required to comply with wage and hour laws and 
safety and health regulations, to avoid discrimination in hiring and firing, and 
to negotiate with duly elected labor representatives. Interactions with customers 
are governed by laws on fair lending, advertising, and product safety; and inter­
actions with suppliers by commercial contracts and trade policy. 
By contrast, firms have considerably more freedom of action in how—if at 
all—they respond to demands by stakeholders with whom they conduct no eco­
nomic transactions. Because they occur outside the marketplace, these interac­
tions are less likely to be governed by law, regulations, or established behavioral 
norms. People sympathetic to gray whales, rioting householders, and human 
rights litigators may be surprisingly important to a firm’s success or failure—but 
clear rules mandating how to engage with them are rarely in effect. The issues 
in dispute may be diffuse and poorly defined, and the people concerned about 
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them may or may not be well organized or even reachable. Managers in these 
situations, such as those at Bechtel, Unocal, and Mitsubishi, have few roadmaps 
to guide their actions. 
What do we know about firms’ responses to disputes with nonmarket 
stakeholders? One important stream in the literature has examined stakeholder 
salience—that is, which stakeholders, among many, stand out as claimants on 
management attention. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood argue in a seminal article 
that managers are most likely to attend to powerful stakeholders advancing 
legitimate claims (ones consistent with broad social norms) in an urgent manner 
(demanding immediate action by the firm). In this view, managers are likely 
to give priority to claims by stakeholders that possess all three attributes—ones 
these researchers term definitive stakeholders.7 This model has stood up well to 
empirical test. For example, 80 CEOs told researchers that the “big three” mar­
ket stakeholders—customers, employees, and shareholders—had first claim on 
their attention. Beyond these, however, they did indeed respond to stakeholder 
power, legitimacy, and urgency—especially the latter.8 
Once stakeholders—particularly nonmarket stakeholders—have manag­
ers’ attention, however, what do managers actually do? We know less about this. 
In an ambitious recent study, Eesley and Lenox examined news reports of more 
than 600 separate episodes over a 32-year period, in which business firms and 
stakeholders clashed over environmental issues. They divided these episodes 
into two groups—ones where the firm yielded to the demands of the stake­
holder group, and ones where it did not. They found that firms were more likely 
to comply with stakeholder demands when confronted with stakeholders with 
significant financial resources relative to the firm’s and whose requests were 
viewed as legitimate by the public.9 This study shed light on the circumstances 
under which management eventually complied, but not on particular strategies 
they used or on whether or not compliance was perceived as positive or negative 
by the firm. 
In short, the literature provides little guidance on the range of strategies 
that managers use in disputes with nonmarket stakeholders, why managers pur­
sue one strategy over another, or the circumstances under which various strate­
gies are effective. This article addresses this gap. 
Inductive Theory-Building from Teaching Cases 
The methodology used is grounded theory-building from field-researched 
teaching cases. This approach draws on well-established methods of inductive 
research, but departs from them by using a novel data source: cases developed 
for pedagogical purposes. 
Eisenhardt, in an often-cited paper, proposes a method for using induc­
tive logic to build theories from case studies. Eisenhardt defines a case study 
as “a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present 
within single settings.” In her view, such research begins with one or more con­
cepts and research questions, but without a priori theory or hypotheses. The 
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researcher then selects cases based on theoretical sampling, seeking “extreme sit­
uations and polar types in which the process of interest is transparently observ­
able.” Eisenhardt favors the use of multiple data collection methods, multiple 
investigator teams, and an iterative process of data collection and data analysis. 
Once field data have been collected, she suggests a process of both within-case 
and comparative analysis to build hypotheses. The outcome of such investiga­
tion, Eisenhardt argues, can be “novel, testable, and empirically valid” concepts, 
conceptual frameworks, propositions, or mid-range theory.10 
Using case studies to build theory inductively, in the manner Eisenhardt 
recommends, has been less common in the literature than one might expect for 
such a powerful and generative research method. This may reflect the substan­
tial effort and resources required in multiple-site field research by teams. I would 
suggest that a fertile source of case data for grounded theory-building—but, to 
date, one that has been largely untouched for this purpose—is the large number 
of cases developed for classroom use. A teaching case is a factual description of 
actual events written to meet specific pedagogical objectives. A separate instruc­
tor’s manual generally provides an analysis of the case situation and an epilogue 
describing its eventual outcome.11 Teaching cases were first used in manage­
ment education at the Harvard Business School in the early 1900s; since then, 
their use has spread widely, and the case method of instruction is now employed 
to some degree in more than three-quarters of business school courses world­
wide.12 
Although no data set is above reproach, teaching cases are actually likely 
to be a particularly useful source of data on the determinants of management 
strategy in stakeholder disputes. Teaching cases are normally based on field 
research and direct interviews with managers and other participants. Thus, they 
can be considered a form of primary, ethnographic data. Case writing conven­
tions adopted by Harvard, Ivey, the North American Case Research Association, 
and other leading case publishers explicitly exclude author analysis. Teaching 
cases are—or try to be—a dispassionate presentation of facts, which are then 
subject to student analysis in the classroom. (The theoretical framing of the case, 
if any, occurs in the accompanying instructor’s manual.) Case publishers gener­
ally require a signed release from the company prior to publication. Cases there­
fore can be said to accurately reflect managers’ view of the actions they took and 
the reasons for them; they are therefore a useful source of information about the 
determinants of managerial strategy. (Because teaching cases usually reflect the 
perspective of management, however, they are less useful as data on the impact 
of company actions on stakeholders and society, a point I will take up later.) 
In this article, I use a carefully selected sample of teaching cases to gen­
erate a typology of management strategies and to derive a set of propositions 
concerning managerial strategies in disputes with nonmarket stakeholders. 
Cases were drawn from the collections of the leading publishers and aggregators 
of teaching cases in business and related disciplines. These are Harvard Busi­
ness School Publishing; the Case Research Journal; Aspen Institute’s Caseplace; 
Pew Case Studies in International Affairs; McGraw-Hill’s Primis; the European 
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Case Clearing House (ECCH); and the proceedings of the North American 
Case Research Association.13 From these case collections, I identified cases 
with a publication date of 1998 or later that focused on a disputed issue involving 
a for-profit business firm and one or more nonmarket stakeholders. (I included in the 
sample several cases that involved disputes between a firm and both market and 
nonmarket stakeholders; in my analysis, I focus on the firm’s interactions with 
the latter.) Following Eisenhardt’s suggestion, I looked for rich, ethnographic 
accounts that provided thickly detailed description in which the subject of inter­
est—management strategy—was transparently observable. 
This procedure yielded a sample of 24 cases, representing a wide range 
of kinds of firms, industries, regions, stakeholders, and focal issues, as shown 
in Exhibit A. (In some instances, several teaching cases were written on the 
same topic; I drew on all available data but counted these only once. In three 
instances, I counted a single company twice, if it operated in different areas or 
across time periods in which its strategy underwent a major shift.) These cases 
provided the data for the analysis; the endnotes provide full references for them. 
I make no claim that this case data set is comprehensive, or even necessarily rep­
resentative. My purpose is not to offer proof, but to generate an analytic frame­
work and offer a set of propositions amenable to more rigorous test by others. 
Four Managerial Strategies 
A close analysis of these cases reveals the four major managerial strate­
gies: wage a fight, withdraw, wait, and work it out. 
Strategy 1: Wage a Fight 
In this strategy, management responds to stakeholders in an adversarial 
manner, opposing activists’ demands and proceeding on its chosen path in defi­
ance of their wishes. Tactics managers may use to wage a fight include organiz­
ing potential allies, filing lawsuits or requesting injunctions, mobilizing public 
opinion, seeking the support of political elites or scientific experts, physically 
intimidating stakeholders, or relying on the police authority of the state. An 
example from the metal mining industry illustrates this strategy. 
Freeport Indonesia and Environmental and Religious Activists 
In the mid-1990s, Freeport Indonesia (part of Freeport McMoRan) oper­
ated one of largest copper, gold, and silver mines in the world. The massive 
open-pit Grasberg Mine, located high on the flanks of a mountain in the Indo­
nesian province of Irian Jaya, processed 110,000 tons of ore a day. Enormous 
earth-moving equipment stripped away rock and dug out metal-bearing ore, 
which was pulverized, treated with chemicals, and transported by pipeline to 
the coast. From there, concentrated ores were shipped overseas to smelters 
around the world. 
As Freeport’s Indonesian operations expanded, they came under intense 
criticism from many quarters. Local environmental activists—later joined by the 
International Rivers Network—charged that the company had harmed glaciers, 
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Latin America (Bolivia) construction 
Asia (Papua New Guinea) metal mining 
BHP Billiton Latin America (Peru) metal mining 
Catamount Energy Nor th America (U.S.) electric utility 
Citigroup Nor th America (U.S.) banking 
Coca Cola Latin America (Colombia) beverages 
De Beers Africa diamonds 
DeCODE Genetics Europe (Iceland) pharmaceuticals 
Endesa Chile Latin America (Chile) electric utility 
Energy Management Inc. Nor th America (U.S.) electric utility 
Freepor t McMoRan Asia (Indonesia) metal mining 
IKEA South Asia (India) furnishings 
KFC (Yum Brands) Nor th America (U.S.) food 
MacMillan Bloedel Nor th America (Canada) forest products 
Mitsubishi Nor th America (Mexico) chemicals 
Monsanto Europe agriculture 
Nike (1990s) Asia (China) footwear 
Nike (2000s) Asia (China) footwear 
Royal Dutch/Shell (1990s) Africa (Nigeria) petroleum 
Royal Dutch/Shell (2000s) Africa (Nigeria) petroleum 
Talisman Energy Africa (Sudan) petroleum 
Unocal Asia (Burma) natural gas 
Ventria Bioscience Nor th America (U.S.) biotechnology 
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Stakeholder(s)  Focal Issue(s)
 
community, labor, human rights coalition water rights 
human rights activists, environmental NGOs environmental impacts of metal mining 
human rights activists, indigenous people alleged expropriation of land, environmental abuses 
community coalition location of wind turbines in scenic area 
environmental NGO lending practices in forest products industr y 
human rights activists suppression of unions; payments to paramilitar y forces 
human rights activists controversy over conflict diamonds 
community; medical practitioners privacy of state health care system medical records 
environmental NGOs, indigenous people location of hydroelectric dam 
community coalition location of off-shore wind turbines 
environmental NGOs, indigenous people, religious activists environmental and social impacts of metal mining 
human rights activists child labor in rug manufacturing 
animal rights activists humane treatment of food animals 
environmental NGOs, community environmental impact of logging 
environmental NGOs location of salt works 
environmental NGOs, food safety activists opposition to genetically modified crops 
human rights activists labor practices in overseas contract factories 
human rights activists labor practices in overseas contract factories 
community, religious, environmental activists alleged human rights, environmental abuses 
community, religious, environmental activists alleged human rights, environmental abuses 
religious, human rights activists demand to divest from Sudan operations 
human rights activists alleged human rights abuses in Burma 
farmers, consumer, and environmental NGOs opposition to genetically modified crops 
community activists opposition to new store location 
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degraded rainforests, and clogged rivers and estuaries with mine tailings. Indig­
enous groups living in the area staged violent protests and filed lawsuits over 
alleged human rights and environmental abuses. A group of religious sharehold­
ers, led by the Mennonite Church of Seattle, offered several proxy resolutions, 
calling on the company to adopt more responsible practices.14 Of particular con­
cern to the company, activists pressured the Overseas Private Investment Corpo­
ration and the World Bank to cancel their insurance policies for the mine, citing 
environmental and safety hazards. 
Freeport hit back hard against its critics. The company worked closely 
with the government of Indonesia, then headed by General Suharto, to provide 
security for its operations, paying $35 million to support a special military task 
force stationed near the mine. It defended itself vigorously in court. The com­
pany dispatched lobbyists to persuade its insurers not to cancel their policies. 
It argued with the Securities and Exchange Commission in an attempt to block 
the Mennonites’ proxy resolutions. All the while, Freeport was digging more 
and more copper, gold, and silver out of the Grasberg Mine. The company’s 
revenue doubled to $1.7 billion annually between 1992 and 1995, reflecting 
stepped-up production at Grasberg as well as a rise in precious metal prices. A 
case researcher summed up his observations by saying that Freeport showed “an 
uncanny ability to run a profitable mining operation in the face of political and 
social unrest.”15 
Freeport McMoRan subsequently changed its strategy—a point to which 
I will return later. However, in the mid-1990s its strategy in its disputes with 
stakeholders was clearly to wage a fight. 
Strategy 2: Withdraw 
Here, management decides to withdraw from the terrain of the dispute, 
in order to pursue its objectives in a different arena or location. In this option, 
management decides to change direction to remove itself from the stakeholder 
conflict, either by pursuing a different course of action or by—literally—moving 
to a different place where it faces less opposition. “Withdraw” can also include 
capitulation—giving up and simply accepting defeat. A case from the biotech­
nology industry illustrates this strategy. 
Ventria Bioscience, Environmentalists, Food Safety Activists, and Rice Farmers 
Ventria Bioscience, a California-based biotechnology start-up, was 
founded in 1993 by an academic biologist who had developed an innovative 
technique for “growing” pharmaceutical proteins in the grains of genetically 
engineered rice. Over its first decade, the company conducted research, obtained 
patents, and completed field trials of two promising medicines designed to treat 
childhood diarrhea. It built a board of directors, hired an experienced CEO, and 
attracted investment from angel investors and two venture capital funds. In 
2004, Ventria’s next step was to expand the production of its genetically modi­
fied rice to commercial scale, which it hoped to do in the Sacramento River val­
ley in central California. 
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When Ventria sought permits from the state government to expand pro­
duction, however, it ran into a firestorm of opposition from a diverse array of 
nonmarket stakeholders. Environmental organizations expressed deep concern 
about potential accidental crossbreeding of pharmaceutical rice with exist­
ing weed species, creating noxious “super weeds.” Food safety activists also 
mobilized to block Ventria, arguing that pharmaceutical rice might become 
accidentally commingled with food, leading to infections, allergic reactions, 
or autoimmune disorders. However, the most formidable opposition came from 
the California rice industry. Many rice farmers and millers, who were politically 
influential and well organized through their trade associations, were worried 
about customers’ perception of the quality and purity of the state’s rice. 
At first, Ventria executives attempted to negotiate with representatives 
of the rice industry to develop production protocols that would satisfy their con­
cerns. When this effort failed, the company began looking in earnest for other 
locations where it could grow its pharmaceutical rice without opposition. In 
2006, the company completed a relocation to Kansas, a state that had no rice 
industry and that had offered Ventria a package of economic incentives. The 
company planted its rice in Kansas and harvested its first major crop in 2007.16 
In this instance, company managers decided to engage in what we might 
consider an orderly retreat from the battlefield, to avoid a conflict rather than 
engage it directly. At some point in the dispute, they decided to cut their losses 
and go somewhere else. 
Strategy 3: Wait 
In this strategy, management bides its time and waits for the conditions 
of the dispute to shift. Waiting is not the same as simply ignoring stakeholder 
demands (or not recognizing them in the first place); it is a conscious strategy 
of using the passage of time to advantage. It is an inherently unstable strat­
egy; either the matter becomes more urgent, or one or the other party gains 
an advantage. Although strategic waiting is probably a common approach, few 
examples appear in the case literature, since delay rarely makes for dramatic 
storytelling. The following case, involving an electric utility in Chile, illustrates 
the approach of strategic waiting. 
Endesa Chile and the Pehuenche Villagers 
In the mid-1990s, Endesa Chile, a private electric utility, began planning 
for the largest-ever hydroelectric project in Chile. Construction of the Ralco 
Dam on the upper part of the Biobio River would require the relocation of about 
ninety Pehuenche families in two villages, whose land would be flooded by the 
reservoir. The Pehuenche were an indigenous group with its own distinctive 
language and culture that had inhabited the area for centuries. 
Although Chilean law gave utilities the right to take land for hydroelectric 
facilities under the principle of eminent domain, it also specified that indigenous 
peoples’ land could be acquired only if it were replaced by land of similar value, 
with their agreement. Accordingly, Endesa began a process of consultation with 
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the Pehuenche communities to determine what compensation they would find 
acceptable. The company bought two parcels of land outside the flood zone and 
began to build new homes, roads, and basic services for relocated families. By 
1998, a majority of Pehuenche families had signed land-exchange agreements 
and had moved to the new communities. Endesa began construction of the dam. 
At the same time, an environmental group, Group Action for the Biobio 
(GABB), mobilized to oppose the Ralco Dam project. Environmentalists’ con­
cerns focused on degradation of the river ecosystem, as well as the loss of what 
many considered one of the world’s best whitewater kayak and float-trip desti­
nations. The group reached out to other NGOs, and environmentalists travelled 
to Chile from the United States and Europe to join in protests against the dam, 
which became increasingly confrontational as opponents occupied buildings 
and burned construction equipment. GABB also sought common cause with 
the Pehuenche and encouraged them to oppose the project. Five Pehuenche 
women, who became known as the nanas, or “grandmas,” asserted that their 
land was sacred and no amount of money would be sufficient to induce them 
to move. 
Instead of acting forcibly to evict the remaining Pehuenche, Endesa 
chose to pursue a more restrained strategy. Endesa managers believed that the 
best approach was to move forward with dam construction, while waiting for 
the Pehuenche holdouts to change their minds as they observed the benefits 
enjoyed by their neighbors who had already moved to their new homes. Accord­
ingly, they bided their time and let the situation play out—to their advantage, 
they hoped.17 
Strategy 4: Work It Out 
The final strategy is to work it out. In this approach, management actively 
engages with stakeholders in an ongoing process of dialogue to arrive at solu­
tions that are mutually acceptable. Working it out does not mean capitulation; 
it simply means an active process of seeking common ground, one that often 
involves the generation of new options. In the literature, this strategy is often 
referred to as stakeholder engagement.18 This strategy may be illustrated by an 
example from the forest products industry. 
MacMillan Bloedel and Environmental NGOs and First Nations Communities 
In the mid-1990s, MacMillan Bloedel, a leading forest products company 
in Canada, became involved in a difficult and protracted dispute with several 
of its nonmarket stakeholders, including environmentalists and First Nations 
(native) peoples. At issue were the company’s logging practices in Clayoquot 
Sound on the western side of Vancouver Island, located off the coast of Brit­
ish Columbia. At the time, Clayoquot Sound was home to one of the largest 
remaining stands of old-growth, temperate rainforest in the world. In its efforts 
to expand its clear-cutting operations there, MacMillan Bloedel confronted vig­
orous opposition from a range of local and international environmental orga­
nizations, which called for a boycott of British Columbia’s forest products and 
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mobilized thousands of protesters to block logging roads in what was then the 
largest act of civil disobedience in Canadian history. First Nations people asserted 
their legal claims to their traditional territory. 
Although the company initially pursued an adversarial strategy—seek­
ing an injunction against protesters and asserting its legal logging rights—it 
soon changed tack. Over a period of several years, the company engaged in an 
ongoing dialogue with its adversaries. Ultimately, MacMillan Bloedel and its 
stakeholders negotiated a series of highly innovative agreements. The company 
committed to phase out clear-cut logging and to set aside special conservation 
zones. The company also entered into a commercial joint venture with the First 
Nations, to be based on traditional aboriginal values and respect for the environ­
ment. It promised to practice variable retention logging and to seek third-party 
certification of its timber, with the intention of seeking markets for its pre-
mium-priced products among environmentally aware customers. In a related 
development, the company signed an agreement with several environmental 
organizations; the environmentalists agreed to call off all blockades and boycotts 
in exchange for the company’s commitment to sustainable harvesting, respect 
for aboriginal values, and an acknowledgment of the value of eco-tourism.19 
In this case, vigorous discussions with a range of nonmarket stakehold­
ers over a several-year period produced changes in management practice that 
won not only acquiescence, but active support from the company’s former 
adversaries. 
Strategic Flexibility 
In real life, managers rarely pursue a single one of these strategies exclu­
sively. Indeed, all of the cases in this sample show elements of more than one 
approach. Often, managers’ actions appear to be improvisational, changing over 
time as circumstances warrant or as favored approaches fail. Ventria Bioscience 
first tried to negotiate an agreement with the rice industry, but gave up when 
this failed and went searching for a state where it could plant its pharmaceutical 
crops without opposition. In this case, the company first tried to work it out, and 
then later withdrew. Endesa Chile waited for a long time—until it was ready, 
in 2003, to open the floodgates of the completed Ralco Dam. At that point, it 
stopped waiting: it brought in high-level mediators, sweetened its offer to the 
holdouts, and threatened to fill the reservoir with or without an agreement. At 
the last possible moment, the firm negotiated a settlement with the remaining 
Pehuenche. In this instance, “wait” morphed into “work it out.” Freeport Indo­
nesia, widely criticized for its resistance to its stakeholder adversaries, later hired 
a vice president for social and community affairs and human rights compliance 
and undertook extensive reforms at its Grasberg operations. A company that 
had been fighting with its nonmarket stakeholders later actively engaged with 
them.20 My classification of cases is not meant to imply that these firms pur­
sued one strategy exclusively; rather, I have attempted to classify their strategies 
according to their dominant type at a particular critical point during an active 
dispute. 
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Determinants of Managerial Strategies 
Further analysis of these cases suggests that three factors strongly influ­
ence which of these “4W” strategies managers will pursue in responding to 
stakeholder demands. These factors are resource dependence, firm power, and dispute 
urgency. Here, I draw on earlier work in organization theory and stakeholder 
theory to propose and elaborate on a set of propositions on the determinants 
of management strategies in disputes with nonmarket stakeholders. 
Resource Dependence 
Resource dependence theory, as articulated by Pfeffer and Salancik and 
others, maintains that organizations depend on external actors—including, of 
course, stakeholders—for resources critical to their survival.21 Firms are espe­
cially dependent on others on whom they rely for resources that are important, 
scarce, and nonsubstitutable. Control over such resources gives external actors 
a source of power in their relationship with the firm. In an important contribu­
tion, Frooman argues for the relevance of resource dependence theory to under­
standing the nature of stakeholder leverage.22 What specific kinds of resources 
do nonmarket stakeholders control? By definition, they do not have market 
power; they cannot offer or withhold goods, money, labor, or credit. However, 
Frooman argues, they often indirectly control important, scarce, or nonsubstitut­
able resources. For example, nonmarket stakeholders may be able to prevail on 
government regulators or political elites to change their policies, bring a law­
suit based on human rights or environmental law to block a project, or use the 
media or Internet to damage (or enhance) a company’s reputation. They may 
be able to influence the moral preferences that customers or shareholders bring 
to their decisions to buy (or not to buy) a product or service or to invest (or not 
invest) in a company’s stock.23 These actions may have significant economic 
impact on the firm. Resource dependence may thus be considered a way to 
conceptualize stakeholder power, relative to the firm. 
Firm Power 
Power is widely understood as the capacity to control the behavior of 
others. In his classic essay on class, status, and party, Weber defines power as 
“the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a com­
munal action even against the resistance of others.”24 (To Weber, power is not 
the same as authority, which is power backed by legitimacy.) Organizations, as 
well as individuals, can and do possess power. In his work on complex organi­
zations, Etzioni extends Weber’s work by identifying several bases of organiza­
tional power. Coercive power rests on “the application or the threat of application, 
of physical sanctions such as infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation 
of frustration through restriction of movement; or controlling through force the 
satisfaction of needs.” In this context, coercive power would include working 
with the courts, police, military, or paramilitary forces to suppress stakeholder 
protest. Utilitarian power is based on control of material rewards and punish­
ments. In this context, it includes offering financial benefits to (or imposing 
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costs on) a firm’s stakeholder critics. Finally, normative power is persuasive; it rests 
on the firm’s ability to allocate and manipulate symbols. This might include, for 
example, the ability to convince others, based on access to expert opinion.25 
Dispute Urgency 
The study by Mitchell and his colleagues, mentioned earlier, defines 
urgency as the degree to which stakeholders demand immediate action. I am 
using the term differently: as the sense of urgency experienced by management to 
resolve a particular dispute quickly. A number of factors can escalate the urgency 
to the firm of resolving a particular dispute. Investors may pressure managers to 
address stakeholder concerns promptly, particularly if the dispute is preventing 
a revenue-generating project from moving forward. Angel investors or venture 
capital firms may be especially impatient to achieve a quick return. In the cases 
analyzed here, Ventria Bioscience, DeCODE Genetics, and Energy Management 
Inc. were all privately held startups under pressure from their backers. The shut­
down of operations because of a dispute also produces time pressure, particu­
larly if the loss of revenue is significant. Bechtel, BHP Billiton (Peru), MacMillan 
Bloedel, and Royal Dutch/Shell all faced at least temporary suspension of opera­
tions because of stakeholder conflicts. Finally, vagaries of the business cycle or 
the seasonality of a particular industry may heighten urgency. Both Monsanto 
and Ventria Bioscience, for example, operated in agriculture, where delays could 
mean the loss of an entire growing season. All of these factors can build pressure 
for a speedy resolution. 
For the purpose of simplicity, I have classified resource dependence, firm 
power, and dispute urgency in these cases as dichotomous variables, that is, as 
either “high” or “low.” In real life, of course, they are present or absent by 
degrees. 
The hypothesized relationship between resource dependence, firm power, 
and dispute urgency and the 4W strategies is represented graphically in Figure 
1 as a triple Venn diagram. Because I am interested in the interactions between 
and among these three variables, the model specifically addresses the strategies 
that are likely to be used when high levels of least two of the three determinants 
are present (that is, where two or more circles in the diagram overlap). 
Figure 1 may be summarized in a series of propositions, which I label W1 
through W4, following the typology of strategies. 
Proposition W1: Firms are most likely to wage a fight where management has low resource 
dependence, high power, and faces an urgent issue. 
Freeport Indonesia fits the W1 pattern. Its dependence on its critics was 
low. Although vocal, the activist stakeholders were unable to affect sales of the 
company’s copper, gold, and silver, which were sold mainly to other businesses 
rather than to individuals. For this reason, the company was not particularly 
concerned about its reputation. The company was easily able to defeat activist 
shareholders in proxy voting. The company held considerable coercive power 
through its relationship to the military government in Indonesia, as well as 
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FIGURE 1. Determinants of Managerial Strategies in Disputes with Nonmarket Stakeholders
 








utilitarian power through its ability to offer jobs, tax revenue, and other ben­
efits to the local community. Nonetheless, it considered it urgent to deal with 
its adversaries—particularly because of the threat to its risk insurance—and 
did so assertively. Other cases in this sample that fit this profile include Royal 
Dutch/Shell, which mobilized multiple sources of power to overwhelm crit­
ics of its community and environmental impacts in Nigeria in the 1990s,26 and 
Unocal, which pushed ahead with its joint venture in Burma despite vigorous 
opposition.27 
Proposition W2: Firms are most likely to withdraw where management has high resource 
dependence, low power, and faces an urgent issue. 
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Ventria Biosciences fits the W2 pattern. The company was highly depen­
dent on the powerful rice industry, which opposed Ventria’s plans and was in 
a strong position to influence whether or not the company received regulatory 
approval. The rice industry was backed by environmentalist and food-safety 
activist allies. Ventria itself, a tiny 20-person startup, had few sources of power 
relative to its critics. Ventria’s venture capital backers were impatient to move 
forward, and because of the nature of the agricultural growing season every 
delay threatened the loss of another full year. Another case in the sample that 
fits the W2 pattern is DeCODE Genetics, an Icelandic biotechnology firm. The 
company’s plan was that Iceland’s extensive medical and genealogic records 
could be combined with DNA data from donated blood samples to identify genes 
linked with particular diseases that ran in families. Yet, DeCODE Genetics ran 
into intense controversy over potential violation of medical privacy, as well as 
over the use of government health service data to enrich a private firm and its 
investors. Eventually, DeCODE abandoned its national database approach and 
pursued voluntary partnerships with doctors who specialized in particular dis­
eases. In the face of high dependence, low power, and urgency, the company 
simply withdrew from one arena and entered another. 
Proposition W3: Firms are most likely to wait where management has high dependence and 
high power, but the dispute is not urgent. 
In the Endesa case, an example of W3, the company was dependent on 
the Pehuenche community in order to meet its core interest of opening the 
Ralco Dam, because Chilean law required the company to compensate them 
to their satisfaction before taking their land by eminent domain. This gave the 
Pehuenche villagers effective veto power over the project. The villagers’ alliance 
with environmentalists from around the global gave this group power out of 
proportion to their numbers, through public protest, legal action, and negative 
publicity. Endesa, as a politically well-connected utility, had considerable power 
it could have wielded. Yet, for a period of about six years, the matter was of low 
urgency to the company, because it was able to proceed with dam construction; 
it needed the cooperation of the Pehuenche only when it came time to flood 
the reservoir. This gave managers the option of waiting to see if the remaining 
villagers would change their minds (which, eventually, they did). Endesa is the 
only case in this sample that completely fits this pattern. 
Proposition W4: Firms are most likely to work it out where management is powerful, but 
faces an urgent issue and stakeholders on whom they depend for critical resources. 
MacMillan Bloedel fits the W4 pattern. The company faced an urgent 
problem when its logging operations were shut down by protests and lawsuits 
in the last 1990s; it was effectively unable to make money until the conflict was 
resolved. Its stakeholder adversaries controlled important resources, through 
their ability to influence global consumer behavior and land use regulations. 
At the same time, the company itself possessed considerable power, through its 
access to the courts and its legally enforceable logging contracts. The combina­
tion of high dependence, high power, and urgency propelled the company into 
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a series of innovative negotiations with its adversaries. In effect, working it 
out is most likely where power meets power, and the issue is of great urgency. 
Another case that fits this pattern includes Royal Dutch/Shell in the 2000s. 
Faced with mounting opposition from environmentalist, religious, and human 
rights activists and a serious threat to its reputation, Shell undertook an exten­
sive dialogue with stakeholders and significantly altered its practices.28 
Exhibit B, columns 2 through 4, shows the classification of cases in the 
sample according to dependence, power, and urgency. 
Strategic Alignment in Responding 
to Nonmarket Stakeholders 
Managers do not routinely pursue strategies that meet their objectives 
in these disputes; indeed, they often fail to do so. In my analysis, I have sought 
to understand managers’ objectives as they define them—whether that means 
bringing a hydroelectric dam on line, harvesting a crop, obtaining risk insur­
ance for their mining operations or, more nebulously, retaining the confidence 
of shareholders and the loyalty of customers. Exhibit B reports my classification 
of these cases, according to whether or not management was able to meet its 
particular objectives (column 7). I would argue that managers are more likely 
to meet their objectives when they pursue a strategy that is well aligned with 
the particular patterns of dependence, power, and urgency in the situation; con­
versely, they are less likely to do so when their strategy is misaligned. Alignment 
(that is, whether or not the strategy “fits” the pattern of dependence, power, and 
urgency) is reported in column 6. 
Two cases in the sample, Energy Management Inc. and Coca-Cola, illus­
trate strategies that were poorly aligned with conditions management faced— 
and that proved ineffective. 
Energy Management Inc. and the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound 
In 2001, Energy Management Inc. (EMI), a small, privately held startup, 
announced its intention to build a wind farm in Nantucket Sound, about six 
miles off the shore of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The project, called Cape Wind, 
almost immediately generated intense opposition from a wide range of indi­
viduals and groups, who coalesced as the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound. 
Opponents of the wind farm included socially prominent residents of Cape Cod 
and nearby islands, business organizations, commercial fishing groups, boat­
ing clubs, local airports, and some environmental groups. These individuals 
and groups were concerned that the proposed wind farm would spoil the view, 
reduce tourism, threaten migratory birds, and risk the safety of commercial 
fishing boats, passenger ferries, and commuter and private aircraft. Opponents 
raised millions of dollars, lobbied, and filed lawsuits to block the development. 
EMI forged ahead in the face of concerted opposition, contesting the lawsuits, 
mobilizing supporters of renewable energy, and funding its own research to 
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Bechtel HIGH LOW HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
BHP Billiton (Papua) HIGH HIGH HIGH W/DRAW NO NO 
BHP Billiton (Peru) HIGH HIGH HIGH WK/OUT YES YES 
Catamount Energy HIGH LOW HIGH W/DRAW YES YES 
Citigroup HIGH HIGH HIGH WK/OUT YES YES 
Coca Cola HIGH HIGH HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
De Beers HIGH HIGH HIGH WK/OUT YES YES 
DeCODE Genetics HIGH LOW HIGH W/DRAW YES YES 
Endesa Chile HIGH HIGH LOW WAIT YES YES 
Energy Management HIGH LOW HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
Freepor t LOW HIGH HIGH FIGHT YES YES 
IKEA LOW HIGH HIGH WK/OUT NO YES 
KFC (Yum Brands) HIGH HIGH HIGH WAIT NO NO 
MacMillan Bloedel HIGH HIGH HIGH WK/OUT YES YES 
Mitsubishi HIGH LOW HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
Monsanto HIGH LOW HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
Nike (1990s) HIGH HIGH HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
Nike (2000s) HIGH HIGH HIGH WK/OUT YES YES 
Shell (1990s) HIGH HIGH HIGH FIGHT NO NO 
Shell (2000s) HIGH HIGH HIGH W/OUT YES YES 
Talisman Energy HIGH LOW HIGH W/DRAW YES YES 
Unocal LOW HIGH HIGH FIGHT YES YES 
Ventria Bioscience HIGH LOW HIGH W/DRAW YES YES 
WalMar t HIGH HIGH LOW FIGHT NO NO 
counter the objections of opponents. In 2008, the company was running out of 
money, and the project remained stalled.29 
Arguably, this is a situation where the company urgently needed to move 
forward, but faced well-organized opponents on whose goodwill it depended 
and commanded few sources of power. The company waged a fight, when a 
withdrawal strategy might have been more appropriate. 
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The contrast with another firm—Catamount Energy, which sought to 
erect wind turbines on a mountaintop in Vermont—is instructive. This firm, 
faced with opposition from a similar coalition of local residents, the tourism 
industry, and outdoor recreationists, simply moved its wind project to Texas, 
where it was met with enthusiasm. Here, a well-aligned withdrawal strategy 
worked.30 
Coca-Cola in Colombia 
In the mid-2000s, Coca-Cola confronted a campaign by activists dismayed 
by what they viewed as the company’s complicity in the violent suppression of 
labor organizing in Colombia. The “Campaign to Stop Killer Coke,” led by vet­
eran activist Ray Rogers, alleged that paramilitary security forces hired by man­
agers of one of Coca-Cola’s bottling plants in Colombia had murdered several 
union leaders in order to intimidate their supporters. The Killer Coke campaign, 
backed mostly by students, established a web site (killercoke.org), called on col­
leges to ban sales of the beverage, organized opposition at shareholder meet­
ings, and joined lawsuits against the company. The campaign’s stated goals were 
to compel Coca-Cola to investigate violence at its bottling plants, respect labor 
rights, and compensate victims. In response, management took the position that 
Rogers was “trying to use the [Coca-Cola] brand to advance a political agenda 
that has nothing to do with the company.” The company aggressively took on 
its critics—denying wrongdoing, forcibly ejecting activists from its shareholder 
meetings, defending itself in court and in the press, and establishing a counter 
web site (cokefacts.org). This did not solve the company’s problem. The Uni­
versity of Michigan, Rutgers, NYU, and several other universities banned Coke 
products from campus, and activists pushed for a national boycott of the prod­
uct. TIAA-CREF removed Coca-Cola stock from the holdings of its Social Choice 
fund, and the value of the brand declined.31 
Coca-Cola, perhaps underestimating the campaign’s potential damage 
to its reputation, especially among young adults and social investors, had waged 
a fight where working it out might have been more effective. 
Nike, which also faced a campaign by student activists focused on the 
labor practices of its overseas contractors, provides a valuable contrast. At first, 
Nike maintained that what happened in the factories of its suppliers was simply 
not its responsibility. Later, however, it gradually changed its approach, intro­
ducing a code of conduct, hiring third-party auditors, creating a new office of 
corporate responsibility, and participating in a cross-sector consortium called the 
Fair Labor Association. While Nike continued to attract some criticism, it made 
good progress in restoring its reputation. Here, a well-aligned effort to work it 
out yielded benefits to the firm.32 
Columns 7 and 8 in Exhibit B show the relationship between alignment 
and outcomes in these cases. Figure 2 expresses this relationship in a two-by­
two table and provides a test of statistical significance. These cases suggest a 
strong association between alignment and the effectiveness of management 
strategy; firms that correctly assess their dependence and power in a particular 
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FIGURE 2. Strategic Alignment and Ability to Meet Objectives
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situation, and its urgency, and select an appropriately aligned strategy are more 
likely to meet their objectives in the dispute. 
A Deviant Case 
Exhibit B and Figure 2 point to a notable deviant case in this sample: 
IKEA, the Swedish home furnishings retailer. This firm pursued a work-it­
out strategy despite low dependence on stakeholder critics. Here, I will briefly 
explore the lessons suggested by this anomaly. 
In the mid-1990s, two documentaries were shown on European televi­
sion that spotlighted the issue of child labor in the rug industry in South Asia. 
After IKEA was mentioned as one of several importers of hand-woven rugs 
from that region, activists held protests outside several IKEA stores. The com­
pany responded immediately by sending a legal team to Geneva to consult with 
the International Labor Organization about how to address the issue. It promptly 
adopted a clause in all supply contracts that stated that any supplier employ­
ing children under legal working age would be terminated immediately. The 
company also reached out to UNICEF and Save the Children, a child-advocacy 
NGO, for further guidance. After extensive discussions, IKEA decided to fund a 
community-development project in villages in the carpet belt in northern India, 
to be administered by UNICEF, providing alternative schools, community loans, 
and vaccinations as a proactive approach to avoiding the economic necessity for 
children to work. The company integrated child labor issues into its established 
supplier auditing programs, set up initially to track environmental compliance, 
and instituted regular reviews of its rug suppliers. 
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What is unusual about this case is that the company’s very active 
response to the issue of child labor was so disproportional to the stakeholder 
criticism it attracted. What could possibly explain the causal arrow running 
from a couple of television documentaries and a few placard-carrying protestors 
to IKEA’s decision to fund alternative schools in hundreds of villages in India? 
IKEA, following the beliefs of its founder Ingvar Kamprad, had a longstanding 
commitment to environmental and social responsibility. It already had a code of 
conduct for its suppliers (the IKEA Way on Purchasing Products, or IWAY), with 
an established compliance process. It also had a business area manager for car­
pets, Marianne Barner (later promoted to a newly created position of children’s 
ombudsman), who happened to be deeply concerned about children’s rights and 
took initiative on behalf of the company. The case writer noted, “[Barner] knew 
she had to protect not only her business but also the IKEA brand and image. Yet, 
she viewed her responsibility as broader than this: She felt the company should 
do something that would make a difference in the lives of children.”33 
IKEA’s creative engagement with nonmarket stakeholders concerned 
about child welfare clearly went beyond what was necessary in order to respond 
to its critics, who seemingly had little leverage. The company’s top managers 
believed, however, that addressing the issue of child labor was critically impor­
tant because of its potential impact on its reputation with customers, suppliers, 
and employees. Thomas Bergmark, head of IKEA’s social and environmental 
affairs department, told the case writer: “[Top management] has always been 
driven by cost savings. But… I never need to do any calculations to prove to [the 
founder and CEO] that the IWAY program [which included a ban on child labor] 
will pay off. They know it will. And at the end of the day, how we act will be 
reflected in how we are regarded in the market.”34 In the company’s view, their 
proactive response to this issue had significantly enhanced its reputation. In 
short, IKEA came to the issue of child labor with a strong set of values, an insti­
tutional capacity to act, and managers with a personal commitment to finding 
solutions. This deviant case suggests that these organizational characteristics are 
also important determinants of strategy. 
The Normative Dimension of Strategic Choice 
Donaldson and Preston, in a comprehensive literature review, explain 
that stakeholder theory encompasses three disparate elements: descriptive, 
instrumental, and normative. Descriptive stakeholder theory observes empirically 
(and therefore helps us explain and predict) how managers interact with stake­
holders. For example, scholars have examined the circumstances under which 
managers are likely to engage in stakeholder dialogue. Instrumental stakeholder 
theory argues that certain kind of stakeholder interactions work better, or less 
well, than others. For example, a large literature debates whether or not corpo­
rate social responsibility produces bottom line benefits for the firm. Normative 
stakeholder theory argues that some kinds of interactions with stakeholders are 
morally superior to others. Normative theories focus on the rights and obliga­
tions of management, as well as the fairness and justice of various courses of 
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action. In Donaldson and Preston’s view, the normative element is the “central 
core” of stakeholder theory.35 
This article has offered both descriptive and instrumental arguments. I 
have provided a typology of management strategies in disputes with nonmarket 
stakeholders, suggesting that managerial action may be characterized as waging 
a fight, withdrawing, waiting, or working it out. I have also offered a set of proposi­
tions about which strategies managers are likely pursue—and which are likely 
to be effective—under a range of conditions of resource dependence, power, 
and dispute urgency. Managers seeking to resolve conflicts with nonmarket 
stakeholders will find it helpful to understand clearly their own objectives in the 
dispute, as well of those of their critics. They also need a clear-eyed view of their 
own sources of power (or lack of them), their dependencies on relevant stake­
holders (and the power these dependencies gives these stakeholders relative to 
the firm), and the time-sensitivity of the issue at hand. This knowledge will pro­
vide insights into which strategy is most likely to prove effective. 
A limitation of this research is that it does not address the normative 
question; that is, I have not attempted to suggest what managers should or should 
not do. Freeport Indonesia’s strategy of paying paramilitary forces to keep down 
a restive native population might have worked, but was it the just thing to do? 
Endesa Chile eventually prevailed over the Pehuenche villagers and environ­
mentalists, but would it have been better not to have dammed the Biobio River 
at all and to have sought other sources of electric power? Unocal made a great 
deal of money in Burma, but was the cost to local communities, and ultimately 
the company’s reputation, too high? Scholars who have written compellingly 
about the normative dimension of business-stakeholder relations argue that 
the highest purpose of the firm is not to maximize returns to shareholders, but 
rather to create value for all stakeholders.36 In order to address the moral rightness 
of managers’ actions, we would need to know more about the ultimate impact 
of their strategic choices on the full range of affected stakeholders. Unfortu­
nately, teaching cases—based, as they usually are, on interviews with manag­
ers, not stakeholders—are typically a poor source for such information. A more 
comprehensive theory than the one I have offered here would address not just 
when mangers are likely to adopt particular strategies in disputes with nonmar­
ket stakeholders, and when these strategies are likely to be effective; it would 
it would also ask which strategies are just and fair to the stakeholders involved. 
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